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Abstract 
 
Background: Occupational radiation exposure to anaesthetists is increasing as a growing 
number of procedures requiring anaesthetic care are performed using radiological imaging. 
The primary modality of protection during these procedures are lead aprons. The aprons 
used in the three hospitals audited in this study were anecdotally thought to be in poor 
condition, with accompanying serious effects for the wearers. In a review of the literature no 
studies could be identified which measured the radiation exposure to anaesthetists in South 
Africa, nor to assess the adequacy of the protective garments worn in South African 
operating theatres. Although radiation exposure to anaesthetists has been described as low 
in the international literature, this assumes functional protective shielding. 
Objectives: The objectives of this study were to identify and describe pre-existing apron 
maintenance protocols, describe the apron populations in terms of demographic data (age, 
lead equivalence, manufacturer, design) and describe the aprons’ physical condition 
(cleanliness, holes, fasteners). The aprons’ internal, radiation attenuating structure was 
assessed by X-ray and additional radiation transmitted as a result of defects was calculated. 
The aprons were then assessed for adequacy in terms of national guidelines and 
international literature. 
Methods: The research design was that of a descriptive, prospective, contextual study, 
assessing the adequacy of lead aprons used in operating theatres at three hospitals 
affiliated with the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Descriptive data was 
collected by the researcher. The aprons were X-rayed by qualified radiographers under 
standard conditions and the resulting images were assessed by a qualified radiologist. The 
additional radiation exposure was then calculated by the researcher using Microsoft ExcelTM 
2013.  
At each hospital, every apron identified as being used in the main operating theatre complex 
was included in this study. 
Results: A total of 87 aprons were investigated across the three hospitals. Of these 45/87 
(52%) were found to be unsafe for use in operating theatres due to inadequate lead 
equivalence as defined by South African law. A subset of 18/87 (21%) aprons had defects 
identified by X-ray severe enough to render them inadequate for use. 
Conclusion: The majority of aprons investigated were inadequate for use by anaesthetists 
in operating theatres. Insufficient quality control, poor handling by the wearers and vague 
government guidelines were all implicated as causative for the high failure rate. 
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Chapter One 
Overview of the study 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter serves to introduce an overview of the study. The background, problem 
statement, aim, objectives, research definitions, demarcation of the study field, ethical 
considerations, research methodology, the significance of the study, validity and reliability 
and an outline of the report are included. These topics will be presented in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
1.2 Background to the study 
Radiation exposure to anaesthetists in operating theatres is an ongoing concern in 
hospitals across the world (1, 2). Anaesthetists’ exposure to ionising radiation is 
increasing as more specialties begin to use fluoroscopy in theatre and as anaesthetists 
become involved in more procedures requiring imaging outside of theatre (1-5). This 
increased exposure to radiation places the anaesthetist at increased risk of harm in a 
dose dependent fashion (6). 
Radiation exposure in excess of the prescribed safe limits can have deleterious effects, 
including cataractogenesis (7), malignancy (8, 9), and even activation of HIV type I 
replication (10). These risks are magnified if the protective measures employed in theatre 
are not part of a regular maintenance routine (11, 12). 
The literature describes two broad approaches for protecting medical staff in these 
environments: a fixed barrier and protective garments. These methods rely on the use of 
lead or lead equivalents to attenuate the amount of radiation reaching the staff, and in 
some settings a combination of fixed barrier and protective garment is used. (4, 6) Due to 
the practical requirements for an anaesthetist to move freely in theatre, protective 
garments are used more commonly than fixed barriers. At the hospitals involved in this 
study, lead aprons are the only available option in operating theatres. 
Much work has been done to evaluate the safety of anaesthetists who work in 
environments where radiological studies are performed (1, 4, 5, 13). Although the 
consensus from these studies is that radiation exposure to anaesthetists is below 
recommended limits, all of the above studies conceded that this is only true if protective 
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garments are used. There is evidence that even with protective garments pregnant 
anaesthetists may be exposed to unsafe levels of radiation (5). 
In 2001, Lambert and McKeon (11) first described criteria for evaluating and, if necessary, 
rejecting lead aprons. Subsequently their work has been adopted as the de facto standard 
and is cited in multiple government and departmental guidelines worldwide (14-16). 
Criteria for removal from service are based on radiological imaging of the aprons and 
extrapolation of projected additional radiation exposure, as a result of observed defects 
(12). Furthermore it is recommended that aprons are reviewed on an annual basis in order 
to ensure optimal safety (12, 14-18). 
The projected maximum life span of a lead apron is 10 years (11, 12). This is a best-case 
scenario and is dependent on regular cleaning and correct usage and storage of the 
apron. The aprons are subject to damage from both regular wear and tear as well as 
damage from mishandling and incorrect washing (19). Even minor errors, such as folding 
or dropping the apron can cause sharp bends in the protective material rendering it 
defective (11, 20). 
A review of the international literature revealed that high rates of rejection of aprons were 
experienced when inspections were first initiated, 17,9 to 100% (12, 21), but subsequently 
the rate dropped to 3 to 4% per annum (12). This was attributed to longstanding wear and 
tear which had previously not been checked for, followed by a slower rate of damage to 
new garments once the defunct items had been removed from service. 
No South African literature was identified on the topic of protective garments, nor any 
literature on the exposure of South African anaesthetists to radiation. A study was 
conducted to establish the exposure to South African surgeons in theatre, and although 
the sample size was small, it showed that in some instances the exposure was above the 
recommended doses (22). These harmful effects may be magnified if the protective 
garments are inadequately shielding the wearers. 
1.3 Problem statement 
The lead aprons used in the operating theatres at the University of the Witwatersrand 
affiliated academic hospitals i.e. Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital 
(CMJAH); Chris Hani Baragwanath Academic Hospital (CHBAH); and Helen Joseph 
Hospital (HJH), were perceived to be in poor condition. Large numbers of these aprons 
had outward signs of deterioration e.g. worn Velcro replaced by adhesive tape, faded 
exteriors, and even gross defects. Anecdotally these garments were known to be handled 
poorly and contrary to suggested guidelines, as reported by hospital employees. 
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Due to these concerns, it was possible that many of the lead aprons used in these 
hospitals were no longer in safe working order and that anaesthetists and other medical 
staff may have been unwittingly exposed to dangerous levels of ionising radiation.  
1.4 Aim 
The aim of this study was to audit the lead aprons worn by anaesthetists in operating 
theatres at selected academic hospitals affiliated with the University of the Witwatersrand 
and to assess their adequacy according to the criteria established by Stam (12). 
1.5 Objectives 
The objectives of this study were to:  
 describe the lead apron maintenance protocol at each hospital 
 describe the lead aprons available at each of the hospitals in terms of: number, 
age, manufacturer, identifying mark, lead equivalency, and design (single versus 
double layer) 
 perform a visual inspection of the aprons to describe external condition 
(cleanliness, holes, fasteners, blood) 
 perform an X-ray examination of all the available aprons in order to describe the 
size, number and location of defects in the lead lining 
 assess the aprons’ adequacy for protecting healthcare workers. 
1.6 Demarcation of study field  
The research was conducted at CMJAH, CHBAH, and HJH, in their respective theatre 
complexes. CMJAH and CHBAH are central hospitals, and HJH is a regional hospital. All 
three are affiliated to the University of the Witwatersrand, and are referral centres for 
smaller hospitals and clinics, and at times, each other. 
In all three hospitals the operating theatres are functioning 24 hours a day and lead 
aprons are worn whenever imaging is to be used.   
1.7 Research definitions 
The following definitions were used in this study. 
Protective garments:  any form of wearable shielding designed to protect the wearer 
from ionising radiation. This includes but is not limited to: lead aprons, thyroid shields, 
protective eye wear, and gloves. 
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Lead apron: a protective garment available in various configurations, designed to shield 
the wearer from the neck line down to the knees. 
Ionising radiation:  a form of radiation, produced by X-ray machines, capable of causing 
harm to the human body. For the purpose of this study “radiation” will be used to mean 
“ionising radiation” unless otherwise explicitly stated. 
Inadequate lead apron: an apron was deemed inadequate using Stam’s (12) rejection 
criteria. If the defect in the material allowed an additional dose of radiation greater than or 
equal to 0,22 mSv i.e approximately 1% of the annual limit.  
This additional dose of 0,22 mSv is based on the ALARA principle i.e. that radiation 
should be “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” considering practicalities encountered in 
the operating room environment. The measured rate of deterioration once a defect 
appears in an apron is also taken into account. The values obtained for rejection criteria 
match with other practices while providing an easy framework with which to assess 
damage. Stam’s criteria do not produce unacceptably high rates of rejection but do ensure 
a safe margin of error.  
Additionally a lead apron was deemed inadequate if it was of a lead equivalent less than 
that prescribed for use in operating theatres by law (17). 
Visible tears: refers specifically to defects in the outermost layer of material of the 
aprons. 
1.8 Ethical considerations 
Approval to conduct this study was obtained from the relevant authorities of the University 
of the Witwatersrand. An ethics waiver was obtained from the Human Ethics Committee of 
the University of the Witwatersrand (Appendix A) as no humans were involved in this 
study. The data collected will be stored for 6 years. 
This study did not involve any drug or therapeutic management, and was conducted by 
adhering to the South African Good Clinical Practice guidelines (23) and the Declaration 
of Helsinki (24). 
1.9 Research methodology 
1.9.1 Study design 
The research design was that of a descriptive, prospective, contextual study, assessing 
the adequacy of lead aprons used in operating theatres at CMJAH, CHBAH, and HJH.  
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1.9.2 Study population  
The study population comprised the lead aprons in the operating theatres at the three 
hospitals. 
1.9.3 Study sample 
Sample Size 
All of the lead aprons in the operating theatres were included. Thus the sample size was 
87 aprons. 
Sampling method and inclusion and exclusion criteria 
All lead aprons in the main theatre complex at each hospital were included in this study. 
1.9.4 Data collection procedures 
At each hospital the individual responsible for maintenance of the lead aprons in the 
operating theatres was identified, and asked for details regarding the existing 
maintenance protocol. 
Each hospital was visited at a time when as few lead aprons as possible were in use, in 
order to facilitate their inspection without disrupting planned or emergency surgeries. Lead 
aprons were assigned a unique identifying number for identification purposes. The aprons 
were inspected and these findings were recorded on a data collection sheet.  
Each apron was X-rayed by one radiographer at each hospital under standardised 
conditions and a digital X-ray film of each investigation was stored. These films were then 
reviewed by a qualified radiologist. The radiological criteria for rejection were based on 
published guidelines (11, 12), using the size of radiographically identified defects in the 
aprons.  
1.9.5 Data collection sheet 
Two data collection sheets were used (Appendix A). Data collection sheet 1 was devised 
to record the demographics of the aprons being investigated. Data collection sheet 2 
captured information about the maintenance protocols. The data was collected by the 
researcher personally, and entered into a Microsoft ExcelTM 2013 spreadsheet. 
1.10 Data analysis  
The statistical program Statistica 12.5 was used for data analysis. Frequencies and 
percentages were used to summarise categorical data. Normally distributed data was 
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described using means and standard deviations, and that not normally distributed, was 
described using medians and interquartile ranges. 
1.11 Significance of the study 
No literature could be identified on the exposure of South African anaesthetists to ionising 
radiation. Although international studies have shown low exposure rates to anaesthetists 
in the past (13, 25), there does seem to be a trend of increasing exposure rates in the 
literature in recent years (3-5).  
As a precursor to any studies evaluating South African anaesthetists’ occupational 
exposure to radiation, it must first be determined if the aprons are in good working order. 
Anecdotally the lead aprons used by anaesthetists at the hospitals in question were in 
poor condition, some with gross defects, and thought to be older than their 10 year 
maximum lifespan. In order to achieve the low exposure rates described in the literature, 
all of the anaesthetists wore functioning lead aprons. One can not necessarily extrapolate 
this data to our setting as the South African working environment may be different to that 
internationally and importantly it was not known if the lead aprons were in fact attenuating 
the radiation effectively.  
The methodology employed may be transferable to other institutions, and may provide a 
framework for further action in other hospitals in South Africa. The results of this study 
may therefore contribute to a safer working environment. 
1.12 Validity and reliability 
Measures were taken to ensure the validity and reliability of this study. 
1.13 Outline of report 
The report will be discussed as follows: 
Chapter 1: Overview of the study 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
Chapter 4: Results and discussion 
Chapter 5: Summary, limitations, recommendations, and conclusion 
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1.14 Summary 
This chapter provided an introduction and overview of the study. The literature review 
follows in Chapter 2.    
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Chapter Two 
Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the literature surrounding the medical use of radiation. In the first 
section an overview of ionising radiation is provided. The next section contains a review of 
safety guidelines for medical personnel followed by a description of the dangers 
associated with ionising radiation exposure. Following this is a look at radiation exposure 
to anaesthetists and then a review of the literature surrounding protective garments in 
operating theatres and the care and quality control thereof. 
2.2 Ionising radiation 
The electromagnetic spectrum can be broadly divided into two categories: ionising and 
nonionising radiation. Nonionising radiation includes, but is not limited to: visible light, 
radio waves, ultrasound and magnetic resonance imaging. It is generally considered safe, 
as it lacks sufficient energy to disrupt electrons. Conversely, ionising radiation is so 
named as it is capable of removing an orbital electron from matter and thus can affect the 
tissues through which it passes. Examples of ionising radiation include X-rays and gamma 
rays, as well as the products of radioactive decay processes: alpha (α) and beta (β) 
particles. (26, 27) 
Ionising radiation is able to affect tissues by means of an energy transfer. This is termed 
Linear Energy Transfer (LET) and is measured in kiloelectrovolts (keV) per micrometre 
(µm) of tissue. The ionising radiation used in medical procedures (X-rays and gamma-
rays) have relatively low LET as compared with that of products created by nuclear 
fission. (2) 
Radiation dosage is quantified using the SI unit Gray (Gy). One Gy is defined as the 
absorption of one joule of energy, in the form of ionising radiation, per kilogram of matter. 
In order to compare different sources of radiation in different scenarios various definitions 
are used. The effective dose is a measure of cancer risk to a whole organism due to 
ionising radiation delivered non-uniformly to a part or parts of a body. It takes into account 
both the type of radiation and the nature of each organ being irradiated. (28) The 
equivalent dose is measured in Sievert (Sv), it has the same dimensions as the Gy and is 
a measure of potential damage to human tissue. It takes into account the energy of a 
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radiation type relative to gamma rays, by means of a weighting factor (29). For X-ray 
radiation the weighting factor is 1, thus 1 Sv is equal to 1 Gy. (30, 31) 
The effects of ionising radiation can be classified as direct or indirect. High LET radiation 
predominantly has direct effects, meaning that atoms or molecules in the tissue are 
directly ionised or excited, leading to a chain of events causing damage. (2) 
Low LET radiation acts by predominantly indirect effects. The radiation generates high 
energy electrons which collide with other molecules and form free radicals. It is these free 
radicals which then disrupt cell DNA. Cells which replicate at the highest rate are the most 
susceptible to this form of radiation. This damage results in one of the three following 
outcomes: complete recovery; inability to repair the damage leading to apoptosis of the 
cell; or inaccurate repair of DNA causing genetic abnormalities. (2, 30, 32) 
2.3 Radiation exposure guidelines 
In 2007 the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) published ICRP 
Publication 103 which contains updated recommendations for maximum radiation 
exposure in medical staff (33).  
The 2007 guidelines recommend that occupational workers receive a maximum effective 
dose of 20 mSv per year, averaged over five years, with no more than 50 mSv in any one 
year (33). Furthermore, the equivalent dose radiation limit to the skin, hands and feet was 
prescribed as 500 mSv each. In 2011 the ICRP released new guidelines regarding 
exposure to the eye. The new guidelines reduced the equivalent dose limit for the lens of 
the eye from 150 mSv to 20 mSv per year, averaged over 5 years, with no year exceeding 
50 mSv (34). This downward reduction in acceptable dose was due to new information 
coming to light and advancements in the medical knowledge surrounding the susceptibility 
of the eye to ionising radiation (35, 36). The South African Department of Health has 
subsequently adopted these guidelines (37). For pregnant women a maximum equivalent 
dose of 2 mSv to the abdomen is allowed with a foetal dose limit of 1 mSv (37-39). 
The guidelines for members of the general public are much lower i.e. 1 mSv per year 
effective dose (total body); an equivalent dose of 1 mSv per year to the lens of the eye; 
and 50 mSv equivalent dose per year to the skin. (17, 33, 37, 38) 
A distinction is made between “occupational exposure” and “radiation workers”, the former 
encompassing anyone who is exposed to radiation in the course of their daily work and 
the latter being, “any person who is potentially exposed to radiation as a result of his/her 
occupation to more than three tenths of the occupational dose limit” (37). Radiation 
workers need to have their exposure continuously monitored whereas the occupationally 
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exposed do not necessarily require monitoring (40). This creates a grey area into which 
anaesthetists fall. Internationally it has been shown that anaesthetists do not require 
continuous monitoring as their exposure is low and less than the three tenths rule (4, 13). 
At this time no research could be identified on South African anaesthetists and their 
exposure to radiation in operating theatres. 
The South African guidelines state that “all full time theatre personnel must be 
monitored…” except in cases where the expected exposure is “very low”, in which case 
“the requirement for the monitoring of workers must be determined individually.” (40) Thus 
although monitoring of anaesthetists is not strictly prescribed, individual hospitals may find 
it prudent to do so, especially in the absence of any data about exposure in the South 
African context. 
The ICRP also advocates that radiation be kept “as low as reasonably achievable”, or 
simply ALARA. The ALARA principle is based on the concept that there is no known safe 
threshold for the stochastic effects of radiation and that all exposure should be 
minimised. (27) 
In order to minimise radiation exposure the ICRP recommends proper facility design and 
surgical planning (33). Intra-operatively three variables dictate the anaesthetist’s exposure 
to radiation: time, distance, and shielding (3, 4, 6, 16, 30, 31, 41). The basic principle 
being that if one can minimise exposure time, maximise distance from the source and 
make use of adequate shielding, then radiation will be minimised. 
Exposure time in operating theatres or other environments where anaesthetists may be 
expected to work is usually dependant on the skill and experience of the operator 
performing the procedure and the complexity of the procedure being performed (3, 4). 
Cumulative dose to an anaesthetist is dependent on the number of cases or procedures 
requiring fluoroscopy over a given time period. Thus exposure time is often not a variable 
an anaesthetist has control over. Additionally exposure time for anaesthetists is increasing 
in general. Katz (4) found that mean exposure time doubled after the introduction of an 
electrophysiology laboratory in their facility.  
Distance from the exposure source is also essential in determining radiation dose. The 
dose is described by the inverse square rule: the intensity of the beam is inversely 
proportional to the square of its distance from the source (1/d2) i.e. doubling the distance 
reduces the exposure to one quarter (16). Therefore the further anaesthetists are from the 
source of radiation the less radiation they will be exposed to. Modern hospitals may have 
facilities to monitor a patient from the control room (41, 42). While this is advisable, in 
reality an anaesthetist may need to be near the patient in order to administer a safe 
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anaesthetic or may be in a location outside of theatre with cramped conditions, 
necessitating close proximity to the radiation source (3, 4).  
The third variable is shielding. Anaesthetists cannot always rely on time or distance to 
protect themselves. Shielding is therefore of paramount importance. The South African 
Department of Health, Directorate of Radiation Control accepted the guidelines put forth 
by the ICRP in 1990 (17, 18). These state: “any person within 1m of an X-ray source or 
patient when the machine is operated at 100 kV, should wear a protective apron of at 
least 0.35 mm lead or lead equivalency. Other staff in theatre should wear at least 0.25 
mm lead or equivalent aprons for protection.” The South African Department of Health 
further recommends that occupational workers should be provided with “leaded gloves, 
eye protection (leaded glasses), thyroid shields and/or portable shields.” (17, 43) 
2.4 Dangers of ionising radiation exposure 
The effects of ionising radiation exposure are well documented, with many studies 
conducted in different populations; data have been collected from workers in the nuclear 
industry (44), nuclear bomb blast exposed populations (45, 46), patients and various 
medical staff (3, 6, 47, 48). The type of damage which results from excessive radiation 
depends on both the dose delivered and the temporal relationship to the exposure. Effects 
can be defined as somatic i.e. occurring in the individual exposed; or genetic i.e. occurring 
in the offspring of exposed individuals due to mutations inherited from an exposed parent 
(2). Heritable, or genetic effects of radiation have not, however, been demonstrated in 
human cohorts (49, 50). Despite initial concerns about effects on the offspring of survivors 
of nuclear bomb blasts, no evidence has been found for any radiation induced genetic 
diseases (51, 52). 
Somatic effects can be further subdivided into acute and chronic. Acute effects are 
normally associated with exposure to a high dose of radiation in a relatively short time 
interval. High doses are likely to cause cell death, and if a large enough area of tissue is 
affected can lead to organ dysfunction. Lower doses tend to rather result in complete 
repair and recovery, or DNA mutation. (2, 32)  
The resultant damage can be categorised into two final subsets: dose-dependent, known 
as deterministic and non-dose-dependent known as stochastic. Deterministic effects have 
known thresholds above which the manifestations can be expected to increase in severity 
and frequency and below which no effect is expected (53). Stochastic effects have no 
lower limit or threshold and include carcinogenesis. This is the major health concern at 
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doses less than 100 mSv (53). Carcinogenesis can occur with minimal exposure. This is 
because only a single mutation is necessary for cancer development (2, 47). 
Good epidemiological evidence exists for cancer risk at acute radiation exposures greater 
than 50 mSv and chronic exposures greater than 100 mSv. Reasonable evidence exists 
that these limits may be even lower. Medical procedures typically generate doses in the 
range of 3 to 30 mSv. (47) Below these doses it becomes impractical to use 
epidemiological studies to predict risk, as the number of participants required for 
acceptable statistical power and precision, grows very large (see Figure 2.1).               
                       
Figure 2.1 Size of a cohort exposed to different radiation doses, which would be 
required to detect significant increases in cancer mortality in that cohort, assuming 
lifetime follow-up (54) 
In order to extrapolate data from lower rates of exposure a model must be used. Various 
models have been proposed but the “linear non-threshold” model is currently thought to 
be the most accurate: 
Although other dose–response relationships for the mutagenic and carcinogenic 
effects of low-level radiation cannot be excluded, no alternate dose–response 
relationship appears to be more plausible than the linear non-threshold model on 
the basis of present scientific knowledge (55). 
“Linear” refers to the proportional effects of radiation when extrapolating below levels for 
which data exists, “non-threshold” refers to the absence of a lower limit, i.e. there is no 
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limit below which it can be assumed that the effects are zero. Interestingly, a study by 
Derby et al. (56) investigated coronary disease in breast cancer patients who had 
received radiation. The authors found “incidental exposure… increased the rate of major 
coronary events by 7.4% per gray, with no apparent threshold” thus confirming the model. 
The impact of acute exposure can be described relative to the dose and sensitivity of the 
cell type, as defined by the “Law of Bergonie and Tribondeau” (57, 58). These turn of the 
century scientists proposed that tissue radio-sensitivity was a function of the metabolic 
state of the tissue.  
The law is as follows: 
 “stem cells are the most radio-sensitive cells 
 the younger the tissue or organ, the more sensitive 
 older cells are relatively more resistant to radiation 
 radio-sensitivity increases as metabolic activity increases 
 radio-sensitivity increases as cellular proliferation rate increases (57).” 
This law allows one to understand and predict the relative radio-sensitivity of various 
tissues and organs. Bone marrow, reproductive cells, lymphoid tissue, thyroid and 
gastrointestinal cells are at greatest risk, whereas bone and cartilage can be said to be 
relatively radio-resistant (30). Developing foetuses are at very high risk and extra 
measures are recommended to protect them from radiation exposure (59). 
Acute exposure, particularly to high LET radiation, affects the body in a relatively 
predictable, dose related fashion. Collectively these effects are known as “Acute Radiation 
Syndrome” (Table 2.1) (60). These effects range from mild haematopoietic changes in 
blood count (0.05 Gy total body radiation) to central nervous system failure with apnoea, 
cardiovascular collapse and death (>20 Gy) (2). Acute radiation syndrome has four 
stages:  
 The prodrome, occurring after an effective dose of 1 Gy or more, involves gastro-
intestinal and haematological symptoms. The length and severity of the prodrome 
is determined by the exposure dose. 
 The latent period, during which no symptoms are evident, can last from hours to 
weeks depending on the dose received. 
 The manifest stage can affect all organ systems, if the dose is non-lethal recovery 
may take up to six months, during which time, exposed individuals may have 
gastrointestinal, haematopoietic, central nervous system and/or cardiovascular 
symptoms. 
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 The final stage is either recovery or death. This is largely dependent on the dose 
received and the degree of medical assistance provided. (31) 
Table 2.1 Variation in presentation of acute radiation syndrome with increasing 
radiation dose (2). 
Exposure dose (Gy) 
total body radiation 
Effect 
< 0.05 Nil immediately quantifiable effects. 
0.05 – 0.5 Change in blood cell counts. 
0.5 – 1.5 Likely gastrointestinal effects including nausea, vomiting, 
fatigue, and loss of appetite. 
1.5 – 10 Gastrointestinal symptoms appear immediately. 
Severe changes in blood cell counts. 
1.5 Gy is known as the death threshold, death will occur in 
the most sensitive individuals. 
3 to 5 Gy 50% mortality within 60 days without intensive 
medical support. 
Death is due to bone marrow suppression.  
Bone marrow transplant required to survive. 
10 – 20 100% mortality within 2 weeks due to gastrointestinal failure. 
> 20 Death due to CNS failure. 
 
Low LET radiation such as from X-rays and fluoroscopy, as would be encountered by 
anaesthetists in operating theatres, can also result in severe disability, although the 
energy is lower, a high dose is still dangerous (53). The most common of these effects are 
described in the discussion below. The radiation exposure values which follow represent 
exposure to a particular organ and are equivalent doses and so appear very high in 
comparison to doses in Table 2.1, which are effective or total body doses. 
The skin is the first barrier to radiation and is therefore commonly affected. Erythema may 
be the only visible effect at doses of 2 to 5 Gy. Desquamation, telangiectasia and atrophy 
occur at doses above 10 Gy and chronic permanent ulceration above 15 Gy. (53, 61)  
This can be of concern for patients (27), and anaesthetists performing pain procedures in 
close proximity to the X-ray beam (62). 
Radiation exposure leads to cataract formation (7, 36). The likelihood of its occurrence 
and the degree of opacity is proportional to the dose received. Similarly the latent period is 
proportional to the dose received, thus higher doses result in cataract formation earlier 
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than chronic low dose exposure. (53) Previous estimates suggested a threshold of 2 to 
5 Gy depending on the duration of the exposure (7). Subsequently these estimates have 
been reduced greatly, and may not even have a lower limit (53). This is in keeping with a 
linear non-threshold model and is what led to the new ICRP guidelines for exposure to the 
eye, which are much lower than previous guidelines (34). 
Reproductive organs are affected by radiation which can lead to reduced fertility or 
infertility. The male reproductive system is more sensitive than the female. In males, 
temporary infertility occurs after acute doses of 500 mGy and permanent sterility can 
occur above 6 Gy. Cumulative doses of 20 to 50 mGy per week can result in permanent 
sterility if total dose exceeds 2,5 to 3 Gy. In females the dose required to cause infertility is 
age dependent. Younger women are more radio-resistant with 10 Gy causing sterility 
before puberty versus 2 to 3 Gy in women over the age of 40. (53) 
As noted previously, the haematopoietic and lymphatic systems are amongst the most 
radio-sensitive in the body (30). The time from radiation exposure to the onset of 
haematological changes is related to the life span of the affected cells. Lymphocytopaenia 
may occur within hours whereas granulocytopaenia and thrombocytopaenia occur over 
days. Depletion of red cells occurs over weeks owing to their relatively longer life span. 
These responses can be seen after acute doses of as little as 0,5 to 1 Gy. (53) 
Immune function can be compromised after either acute, 1,5 Gy, or chronic, 0,3 to 0,5 Gy 
per year, exposure. The changes in the cellular immunity are as a result of the paucity of 
immune cells from the effects on the haematopoietic and lymphatic systems. Evidence 
suggests there may be an effect on inflammatory responses as well. (53) In vitro 
studies (10) have also shown that ionising radiation can up regulate the replication of 
HIV I, which is similar to the effects of other DNA damaging agents on the replication of 
the virus. 
Chronic radiation presents in a similar manner to chronic inflammation: local effects like 
ulceration, stenosis, fibrosis and atrophy are common (2, 6, 27, 30). Furthermore, 
following an acute exposure or even acute radiation syndrome, an exposed individual may 
still be at risk of long term complications such as carcinogenesis (31). Acute or chronic 
leukaemias and solid tumours are all possible (2, 48).  
Radiogenic cancers are indistinguishable from those due to other causes, and are 
characterised by a latent period. Generally the time from exposure to presentation of the 
tumour is 7 to 10 years for blood based tumours and 20 to 30 years for solid tumours. The 
risk of carcinogenesis is related to the dose received and the tissue affected. (53) 
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2.5 Radiation exposure to anaesthetists 
The greatest source of occupational exposure to anaesthetists, and doctors in general, is 
fluoroscopy (63). Increasingly anaesthetists are being involved in patient treatment 
involving fluoroscopy both in and out of the operating theatre (2-5, 64). Some 
anaesthetists also perform fluoroscopic guided procedures for pain, placing them at even 
greater risk for occupational radiation exposure (65).  
Studies into the dose and effects of radiation on anaesthetists have been performed 
intermittently since at least 1965, when Trachtenberg et al (66) described exposure during 
“radium implantation procedures”. In more recent years interest in the subject has been 
rekindled as anaesthetists found themselves exposed to ever increasing use of imaging 
technologies (1, 3-5, 13, 25, 67). 
Study designs have varied, but all involved the use of some form of “dosimeter” to 
measure radiation. A dosimeter is a device containing radiation sensitive material. It is 
available in different sizes, and is worn on people or placed on objects. The dosimeter 
stores dose information about ionising radiation which can be read off at a later time. (68) 
Niklason et al (69) described a technique for using two dosimeters to estimate the 
effective total body dose when a protective apron is worn, with one worn below the apron 
at waist level and one outside the apron at the level of the collar. Most of the studies 
reviewed used this methodology. 
Overwhelmingly the international studies reviewed showed that if using standard 
protective garments, the occupational radiation exposure to anaesthetists is very low or 
even negligible (1, 3-5, 13, 25). In all of the studies the anaesthetists wore lead protective 
aprons, and in all but two of the studies (1, 13), the anaesthetists wore lead thyroid shields 
as well. Henderson et al (25) described one anaesthetist who wore two lead aprons 
simultaneously and a thyroid shield, and moved more than three metres from the 
exposure source in every case. He received the lowest exposure despite being in 
operating theatres using fluoroscopy for some of the longest hours when compared to 
other participants in the study.  
Although the studies mostly found low exposures overall, Durack et al (5) made special 
mention of individuals in the study who were outliers. In their study, one anaesthetist 
received a collar (thyroid) dose of 7,08 mSv in one month which raised “concern”, and 
they strongly recommended that all anaesthetists wear thyroid collars. Further, they noted 
that although the overall exposure was within safe limits, it was far above the limit for 
pregnant women (5, 39). Ismail (1, 3), conducted two similar studies to assess exposure 
to anaesthetists in operating theatres. These studies took place in the same institution 
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approximately four years apart. In the first study none of  the anaesthetists ever wore 
thyroid shields (1), yet by the time of the second study, hospital guidelines had changed 
and all the anaesthetists wore thyroid shields routinely (3). 
Of interest, two of the earliest studies, Henderson (25) in 1994 and McGowan (13) in 
1996, recorded the lowest exposure. Henderson found the dose to be “negligible”, 
whereas in McGowan’s study the dose was below the detection limit and “effectively 
zero”. In contrast, the later studies (1, 3-5), from 2005 onwards found significant albeit 
safe radiation exposure. Although it is not possible to attribute this perceived rise in 
exposure dose to any one cause, it does seem to suggest a trend of increasing risk to 
anaesthetists. Katz (4) found that the mean radiation exposure to anaesthetists doubled 
after the introduction of an electrophysiology laboratory, but in one individual it increased 
more than 18 fold.  
Several studies were identified which produced different results, especially with regard to 
the eyes (42, 67, 70, 71). One was designed to assess the exposure to nurse 
anaesthetists during ureteroscopic procedures under fluoroscopy (67). This study simply 
attached a dosimeter to the anaesthetic machine and recorded the results. Although it 
was a poorer reflection of real world experience than other studies, the authors concluded 
that potentially dangerous doses of radiation were possible if anaesthetic staff were not 
wearing adequate protection Of note, at the time this study was published the 
extrapolated exposure to the eyes was deemed within safe limits, but today the same 
dose would be regarded as dangerous (34).  
In another study Anastasian et al. (70) found that exposure to anaesthetists’ eyes during 
interventional procedures was six times greater than for non-interventional procedures 
and three-fold greater than that of the radiologist performing the procedure. The authors 
concluded that some anaesthetists may have ocular doses similar to the radiologists and 
that protective eyewear should be worn. 
No studies related to anaesthetists’ exposure in South Africa could be identified. A study 
of South African surgeons’ exposure, showed that at times the radiation dose was higher 
than the safe limits set forth by the Department of Health (22). In this particular study this 
was attributed to improper placement of the X-ray tube i.e. an operator error, with the 
operator in this instance being the surgeons themselves. 
This lone South African study highlights the need for further research in the South African 
context. Although the international studies have shown that radiation exposure to 
anaesthetists is low, this is not necessarily the case in our setting. The South African 
Department of Health has stipulated that the operator of a c-arm (mobile fluoroscopy) unit 
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“must be a radiographer or radiologist” (37), in the South African public hospitals this is 
not always the case. Similarly the Department of Health recommends that fluoroscopy 
equipment be checked three-monthly (72), this too is thought to not always be adhered to. 
With the South African reality in mind, it is apparent that relying on international findings 
may not be appropriate. It is not possible to make direct comparisons of outcomes if 
international institutions are performing daily checks of their X-ray equipment (25, 73), 
whereas no clear timetable is thought to be adhered to in some of the hospitals in the 
public health sector in South Africa. In all of the studies reviewed (1, 3-5, 13, 25, 41, 67, 
70), the integral role of protective garments is emphasised in great detail and yet 
anecdotally in the South African public hospitals these garments are, in some instances, 
never reviewed. 
2.6 Protective garments in operating theatre 
A multitude of protective shielding devices and garments are available to protect 
anaesthetists from ionising radiation. A brief overview will be provided below with 
emphasis placed on lead aprons.  
Shielding from ionising radiation is achieved by means of a barrier, either fixed or 
wearable, which contains a material able to absorb radiation to a high degree (6, 31). The 
percentage of radiation which is able to pass through this barrier is known as the 
transmission factor and is expressed as a fraction, the lower the transmission the better 
the barrier (12). Lead is often used for this purpose as it has relatively high absorbancy 
allowing it to be made into protective garments which can be worn e.g. 0,5 mm lead 
(mmPb) absorbs gamma rays to the same extent as 3 mm of concrete (6). 
The entire body is at risk of radiation exposure in an operating theatre. Different modes of 
protection are available for the different organs. The eyes, face and head, the thyroid, the 
gonads, the hands and the thoracic and abdominal cavities can all be protected 
depending on the anaesthetists’ requirements and the form of protection employed (6, 17, 
18). The South African Department of Health guidelines state that: 
Only persons whose presence is necessary shall be in the theatre during 
exposures. All such persons shall be protected (e.g., provided with leaded aprons, 
leaded gloves, eye protection (leaded glasses), thyroid shields and/or portable 
shields. (17) 
In current practice, only lead aprons are provided in the main operating theatres at the 
hospitals in this study. Thyroid shields and/or protective glasses are available in neuro-
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interventional suites or occasionally are worn by doctors who have purchased their own 
privately. 
Fixed, semi-fixed, and portable shields take many different forms. Shields can be 
suspended from the ceiling, fixed to the floor, on wheels, attached to the bottom of the 
operating table, or attached to a pivoting arm from the ceiling. These shields are able to 
protect the entire body. (6) Typically the shields are composed of acrylic or glass with the 
equivalent of 0,5 mm lead within them. These barriers are very effective at blocking 
radiation and are more comfortable than the traditional lead aprons which are often heavy, 
but suffer from the drawback of having limited mobility. Shields of this manner are 
generally not subjected to the same wear and tear as wearable garments and thus have 
longer lifespans. (6) 
After several studies found increased risk for cataract development in medical personnel 
in 2010 and 2011 (35, 36, 70), and the ICRP reduced the safe limit for eye exposure in 
2011 (34), eye protection has come under greater scrutiny. It remains the focus of 
ongoing research (42, 71). Some authors now believe that there may be no lower 
threshold for cataract development (53).  
Eye protection is available in several forms: 
 regular leaded glasses (prescription lenses available), with or without side shields 
 leaded glasses that fit over prescription glasses 
 a leaded clip-on shield for prescription glasses 
 a full face shield, which also provides protection from splashes. (6) 
Depending on the form chosen, radiation can be reduced by 5 to 25 times (74). 
Thyroid shields are available as either a “built in” solution, where it is part of a lead apron, 
or as a stand-alone garment worn around the neck (6, 15). The thyroid is one of the most 
radio-sensitive tissues in the body (5, 33). There is a 6% increased lifetime risk of fatal 
cancer after 1 Sv of ionising radiation exposure (6, 75). Furthermore, the effective dose to 
the body is twofold higher if thyroid protection is not worn. This is because the thyroid 
shield protects all the underlying tissues, including skin, bone marrow, vertebrae, and 
oesophagus (74). Therefore thyroid shields are regarded as one of the most important 
shielding devices, second only to lead aprons, and worn routinely by anaesthetists in most 
of the studies reviewed (3-5, 25).  
Hands warrant protection because they are exposed to radiation either by being directly in 
the beam such as during pain procedures or they may be exposed to back scatter (6). 
Radio-protective gloves or “gauntlets” have been developed that can attenuate the dose 
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received by 15 to 30% however some controversy surrounds their use. Some models of 
fluoroscopy machine are able to automatically increase the kilovolts supplied if they detect 
an impedance, thus if an operator leaves his gloved hands in the exposed field, the dose 
may be increased and the benefit from the gloves negated. (6, 76) 
Another concern is that while the gloves may offer some protection to the hands they 
increase the amount of back scatter to other organs (77). Furthermore, these gloves are 
often thicker than normal gloves, reducing the wearer’s dexterity and touch sensation and 
may produce a hazard to the environment if not discarded appropriately. This has led 
some authors to advocate the use of time and distance rather than shielding as the most 
appropriate technique for protecting the hands (77). 
Lead aprons are used to protect the thoracic and abdominal cavities (6). The aprons are 
constructed from lead impregnated vinyl or rubber and are described in terms of their 
shielding abilities equivalent to a thickness of lead in millimetres. Modern lead free, or 
lead-composite aprons are also available. Typically the garments have a nylon outer 
layer. (11, 20, 78) 
Lead aprons are available in a variety of designs. Some cover the front and back with the 
sides exposed, some cover only the front. Some aprons are “wrap-around” allowing for full 
protection in the front, back and sides with a double or overlapping layer in the front. Due 
to weight constraints some aprons have been divided into vest and skirt combinations, 
allowing up to 70 % of the weight to be carried on the hips and helping to alleviate back 
pain. (6, 19) Most of these designs are available in various lead equivalencies, the most 
common being 0,25 mm, 0,35 mm and 0,5 mm, if these aprons are employed in double 
layers then 0,7 mm and 1,0 mm are also available configurations (12). South African 
guidelines dictate that any person who shall be within one metre of the X-ray source or 
patient must wear 0,35 mm lead equivalent shielding and all others must wear at least 
0,25 mm lead equivalent shielding (17, 18). Table 2.2 illustrates the advantages of 
increasing lead equivalence. 
Table 2.2 Transmission values for aprons of different lead equivalences. (12)  
Lead equivalence (mmPb) Transmission  
0,25 0,19 
0,35 0,10 
0,50 0,038 
0,70 0,010 
1,00 0,0014 
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Thus it can be seen that a properly functioning lead apron can drastically reduce exposure 
dose. In order to maintain aprons functioning at this level, strict codes of practice must be 
enforced to care for these garments and regular testing must be performed (6, 20). 
In recent years, lighter aprons have become available on the market. These aprons are 
either “lead free” or made up of “composite” materials (6). In an attempt to make aprons 
that are more ergonomic and more comfortable for the wearer, the lead is replaced or 
mixed with other high atomic numbered elements. The lead substitutes are lighter-weight 
leading to improved comfort. These aprons are defined in terms of lead equivalency, even 
if they contain no lead in order to provide a familiar, easy to use categorisation system. 
Some doubt exists as to whether the manufacturers stated lead equivalency is truly equal 
to the original lead aprons, but further investigation is needed in this regard. (78) 
The maintenance of lead aprons must be multi-faceted. An important aspect of the care is 
staff education. Oyar et al (21), found that personnel were “not aware of the importance of 
preservation and storage conditions, and for this reason they do not heed the rules for 
using, preserving and cleaning aprons.” Lead aprons are very easily damaged, merely 
folding an apron is enough to permanently damage it in such a way as to render it 
ineffective. Doing so causes sharp bends in the vinyl which lead to cracks that are 
permeable to the radiation. (11, 20) Lead aprons should not be laid on a flat surface, and 
must always be hung up by the shoulder or on approved apron hangers (79). 
Another important aspect of maintenance is the cleaning of these aprons. Daily cleaning is 
recommended, using a soft bristle brush and water to remove any residue. Bleach should 
be avoided and the aprons should never be laundered or dry cleaned. (6, 79)  A properly 
cared for apron can last up to 10 years (11, 15). This is however only if it is used, stored 
and cleaned as described, if this is not the case then the efficacy diminishes prematurely, 
potentially placing the wearer at risk (21). 
The cornerstone of radiation safety in theatre is good quality control (6, 80). Owing to the 
relatively fragile nature of lead aprons it is important to assess them for damage on a 
regular basis (11, 81). The South African Department of Health requires that lead aprons 
must be verified to be free of defects via a visual and manual check monthly, and a 
radiographic/fluoroscopic test at least annually with defective items withdrawn from use 
(18). Similar guidelines exist in other countries (82). The guidelines, although reasonable 
in terms of frequency, do not specify criteria with which to judge the adequacy of the 
aprons. 
For many years this left institutions to establish their own criteria, often arbitrarily, and in 
some cases aprons were discarded for only superficial cosmetic damage (11), or 
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conceivably were being kept in service longer than was safe to do so. In 2001, Lambert 
and McKeon (11), first described criteria for rejection of lead aprons. These authors 
borrowed an idea from the nuclear industry which had not been used previously in 
medical arenas. Using the ALARA principle they were able to define “reasonable” as “a 
dollar amount spent to avert a given dose”. From this practice, a mathematical model was 
created which produced criteria for rejecting lead aprons from clinical service based on 
the area of the defects in millimetres squared detected either radiographically or 
fluoroscopically. In addition these criteria could be modified based on the sensitivity of the 
organs over which the defects were situated. (11) 
Lambert and McKeon (11) proposed that aprons be imaged, either with X-rays or 
fluoroscopy and the size of any defects measured. It was recommended that an apron be 
discarded if a defect of 15 mm2 or greater was detected. If the defect was clearly not over 
a critical organ, such as the gonads, then a less stringent 670 mm2 was recommended as 
grounds for removal. Not over a critical organ was defined as “along the seam, in 
overlapped areas, or on the back of the lead apron.” (11) 
These recommendations were the first scientifically derived guidelines for assessing the 
adequacy of lead aprons. In 2002, Michel and Zorn (20), built on the ideas proposed by 
Lambert and McKeon (11) and suggested a more thorough procedure for the annual 
inspection of aprons. They recommended not only radiographic examination of the aprons 
but also a physical inspection for “tears, perforations and thinning creases”. These defects 
as well as those found radiographically were grounds for removal of the aprons from 
service, unless they could be repaired or were found to be safe by a “qualified 
individual”. (20) 
Stam and Pillay (12), further developed these guidelines. As recently as 2008 they 
introduced the concept of “additional dose”. This is the dose that an individual would be 
exposed to as a result of the defect in the lead apron, as described by Lambert and 
McKeon (11). They then went on to say that although the original criteria describe a defect 
with an area in millimetres squared, in practice the defects are often tears with a length 
measured in millimetres. These authors derived an equation to convert the length of a tear 
into an area so that it could be used in the original equation by Lambert and McKeon (11). 
They further modified the equation to take into account lead aprons of double layers 
(wrap-around), the results of which are in Table 2.3. Stam and Pillay (12) also derived 
rejection criteria for aprons exposed to radiation from oblique angles and not simply 
antero-posterior. 
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Table 2.3 Maximum tolerable tear length (mm) for an exposure of 100mSv. (12)  
 
Rejection Criteria 
Lead Equivalence (mmPb) 
0.25 0,35 0,5 
Type of Apron Body Area Maximum Length of Defect (mm) 
 
Single 
Whole Body 59 56 54 
Gonads 19 18 17 
Thyroid 19 18 18 
Double 
Whole Body 135 175 27 
Gonads 44 56 87 
 
Although Lambert and McKeon (11) had recognized the importance of defects over the 
gonads versus the rest of the body, Stam and Pillay (12) refined the idea for practical 
screening purposes. They defined an area on the lead apron, “independent of the physical 
differences between wearers” to be defined as the “gonad area” with everything outside of 
this area defined as “whole body”. The gonad area measures 30 x 35 cm and is measured 
40 cm from the neck-line of the lead apron. Although this area is considerably larger than 
the gonads themselves it provides a margin of safety as well as practicality for assessing 
exposure.  
In 2012 Oyar (21), described an audit of the lead aprons used in their facility. Aprons were 
described in terms of their age, manufacturer, design, lead equivalence, and outward 
appearance and cleanliness. Each apron was then assessed radiographically and a 
measure of their radiation absorption was performed. Of the 85 aprons reviewed 72 were 
found to be unfit for service based on radiographic criteria alone. Only two of the rejected 
aprons were greater than six years old and 50 of the rejected aprons were less than three 
years old.  
In addition to radiographical imaging of the aprons Oyar (21) also used dosimeters to 
assess the amount of radiation that was penetrating through the lead aprons. They 
compared these findings with brand new “control” aprons as well as known transmission 
values for the appropriate lead equivalencies of the aprons in question. Using this 
technique it was found that all of the aprons allowed significantly higher transmission of 
radiation than was acceptable. (21) This highlights the difference between using a derived 
equation to predict additional radiation exposure and actual measurement of radiation 
permeability.  
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Ultimately all 85 of the aprons reviewed were removed from service based on either 
radiographic or other criteria. The authors found no relationship between the aprons’ 
appearances and their radiation permeability. They noted that two “brand new, very clean” 
0,5 mm lead equivalent aprons when examined radiographically had holes and cracks so 
large that the aprons had actually been destroyed. Furthermore no significant relationship 
was found between the total number of users or the period during which the aprons were 
used, and the radiation permeability. (21) 
Despite the increased specificity of measuring the permeability of the aprons directly, 
imaging is still the only method recommended in various governmental guidelines around 
the world, including Canada (15) Australia (14) and South Africa (18). This is presumably 
due to the extra cost, time, and technical skill necessary to use more advanced 
techniques. 
2.7 Summary 
The protection of medical staff from ionising radiation is a broad topic. It encompasses the 
dangers of radiation and the need for protection, the protective methods available, and the 
checks to ensure that the protection is adequate. An overview of the literature surrounding 
these topics has been provided above. Collectively this provides a clear rationale for 
undertaking an audit of the lead aprons used in the three hospitals studied. The chapter 
which follows will outline in detail the methodology employed to conduct the study. 
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Chapter Three 
Research design and 
methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology in depth. Study design, study 
population, sample size, description of data collection procedures and statistical analysis 
will be discussed. 
3.2 Aim  
The aim of this study was to audit the lead aprons worn by anaesthetists in operating 
theatres at selected academic hospitals affiliated with the University of the Witwatersrand 
and to assess their adequacy according to the criteria established by Stam (12). 
3.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this study were to:  
 describe the lead apron maintenance protocol at each hospital 
 describe the lead aprons available at each of the hospitals in terms of: number, 
age, manufacturer, identifying mark, lead equivalency, and design (single versus 
double layer) 
 perform a visual inspection of the aprons to describe external condition 
(cleanliness, holes, fasteners, blood) 
 perform an X-ray examination of all the available aprons in order to describe the 
size, number and location of defects in the lead lining 
 assess the aprons’ adequacy for protecting healthcare workers 
3.4 Problem statement 
The lead aprons used in the operating theatres at the University of the Witwatersrand 
affiliated academic hospitals i.e. Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital 
(CMJAH); Chris Hani Baragwanath Academic Hospital (CHBAH); and Helen Joseph 
Hospital (HJH), were perceived to be in poor condition. Large numbers of these aprons 
had outward signs of deterioration e.g. worn Velcro replaced by adhesive tape, faded 
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exteriors, and even gross defects. Anecdotally these garments were known to be handled 
poorly and contrary to suggested guidelines, as reported by hospital employees. 
Due to these concerns, it was possible that many of the lead aprons used in these 
hospitals were no longer in safe working order and that anaesthetists and other medical 
staff may have been unwittingly exposed to dangerous levels of ionising radiation.  
3.5 Ethical considerations 
Approval to conduct this study was obtained from the Postgraduate Committee of the 
University of the Witwatersrand, and an ethics waiver was obtained from the Human 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Witwatersrand (both in Appendix B) 
as no humans were involved in this study. Approval was also requested from the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of CMJAH, and HJH, and the Medical Advisory Committee at 
CHBAH (Appendix C).  The Head of the relevant radiology departments, and the matrons 
in charge of the theatre complexes were informed of this study.  
Data collected will be stored securely for 6 years following completion of the study. 
Aprons that were identified as not adequate for safe use, were brought to the attention of 
the relevant responsible parties. This allowed the aprons to be removed from service so 
as not to further endanger staff at the hospitals involved. 
This study did not involve any drug or therapeutic management, and was conducted by 
adhering to the South African Good Clinical Practice guidelines (23) and the Declaration 
of Helsinki (24). 
3.6 Research methodology 
3.6.1 Study design 
The research design was that of a descriptive, prospective, contextual study, assessing 
the adequacy of lead aprons used in operating theatres, at CMJAH, CHBAH, and HJH.  
A descriptive study describes the characteristics of the sample being studied. In this form 
of study, variables are not manipulated by the researcher. (83) This study made use of 
radiography, and a physical inspection to describe the quality and adequacy of lead 
aprons used in operating theatres. 
A prospective study design is one where the variables are measured during the time the 
study takes place (83). By taking physical measurements, the variables in this study 
fulfilled these criteria.  
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This study is deemed contextual as it took place in a specific location or area (84). 
3.6.2 Study population  
Each of the three hospitals have lead aprons to protect healthcare workers from radiation. 
In each operating theatre that uses fluoroscopy there is a minimum of one scrub sister, a 
floor nurse, a surgeon, and an anaesthetist. In some cases there may be additional 
nursing staff, one or more surgical assistants, a representative from a company supplying 
medical equipment, and one or more anaesthetic assistants. Each one of these people 
require a lead apron. In addition there may be more than one operating theatre requiring 
aprons at the same time.  
The three hospitals each had a pool of lead aprons which all of the operating theatre staff 
shared, 87 in total. All of these aprons were assessed. 
3.6.3 Study sample 
Sample size 
The aim of this study was to assess the lead aprons in use in the CMJAH, CHBAH, and 
HJH operating theatres, thus the sample size was 87 aprons. Ethically all of the aprons 
needed to be included. In its lifetime each apron is exposed to different wearers and 
conditions, Oyar (21) found no significant correlation between outward appearance, age of 
the apron, or number of users of the aprons and the efficacy of the apron to attenuate 
radiation. It was therefore imperative to include all of the aprons. Similar studies (12, 21) 
have found a 17,9 to 100%, rate of rejection when first embarking on lead apron 
inspection programs. 
Sampling method and inclusion and exclusion criteria 
All lead aprons in the main theatre complex at each hospital were included in this study. 
3.6.4 Data collection sheet 
Two data collection sheets were used in this study (Appendix A). Data collection sheet 1 
was devised to record the demographics of the aprons being investigated. 
Identifying information was collected under the following headings: 
 date of inspection, date of last inspection  
 apron identification number (as designated for this study) 
 hospital 
 manufacturer 
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 lead equivalence 
 design 
 age of the apron. 
The physical appearance of the aprons was documented as follows: 
 presence of pre-existing identifying number or similar 
 cleanliness of the apron 
 presence of blood on the apron 
 presence of visible tears 
 condition of fasteners or Velcro. 
The radiological findings: 
 number, size, and location of cracks (linear defects) 
 number, size, and location of holes (irregular defects) 
Data collection sheet 2 recorded information about the maintenance protocols at the 
hospitals. Information collected included: 
 presence of a cleaning protocol 
 description of cleaning protocol 
 presence of a radiological inspection protocol 
 content of radiological inspection protocol: methodology, frequency, rejection 
criteria 
The data was collected by the researcher personally, and entered into a Microsoft ExcelTM 
2013 spreadsheet. 
3.6.5 Data collection procedures 
Initially at each hospital the individual responsible for maintenance of the lead aprons in 
the operating theatres was identified and asked for details regarding the existing 
maintenance protocol. This was reported on Data collection sheet 2. 
Each hospital was visited on separate days, this was done at a time when as few lead 
aprons as possible were in use, in order to facilitate their inspection without disrupting 
planned or emergency surgeries. CMJAH and HJH were visited on Wednesday 
afternoons, as due to academic responsibilities, this is a time when only emergency 
surgeries are performed. CHBAH was visited on a Sunday morning for similar reasons. 
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Lead aprons were collected from each theatre and were assigned a unique identifying 
number for reference and identification purposes. The aprons were inspected in a hanging 
position. The aprons were then described in terms of their distinguishing features. These 
findings were recorded on Data collection sheet 1. The aprons were also photographed 
for later reference. The cleanliness of the aprons, although subjective, was assessed by 
only one person, the researcher, which ensured consistency in the assessment. 
Each apron was X-rayed by one radiographer at each hospital under standardised 
conditions i.e. 100 kV, 320 mA, 63 ms, at a distance of 110 cm, and a digital X-ray film of 
each investigation was stored. These films were then reviewed by a qualified radiologist. 
Two separate tables were used to collect the information from the X-ray examination of 
the aprons. One to record the number, size and location of linear cracks, and another to 
record the number, size and location of holes. These tables were found on Data collection 
sheet 1. 
The radiological criteria for rejection (Appendix D) were based on published 
guidelines (11, 12), using the size of radiographically identified defects in the aprons. 
Lambert et al. (11) and Stam et al. (12) derived mathematical formulae to reject aprons 
based on the size of the defects found and the lead equivalence of the apron. These 
formulae were programmed into a Microsoft ExcelTM 2013 spreadsheet, and used by the 
researcher to calculate the additional dose of radiation that would reach wearers of the 
aprons. 
3.7 Data analysis  
The statistical program Statistica 12.5 was used for data analysis. Frequencies and 
percentages were used to summarise categorical data. Normally distributed data was 
described using means and standard deviations, and that not normally distributed, was 
described using medians and interquartile ranges. 
3.8 Validity and reliability 
When developing a research study design it is important to be cognisant of the formal 
evaluation of measurement error. Measurements are assessed in terms of reliability and 
validity (85). Reliability is the degree of similarity of the information obtained when the 
measurement or test is repeated on the same subject or the same group. Validity is the 
degree of accuracy with which a measure actually quantifies what it is meant to 
measure. (85) 
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The validity and reliability of this study was ensured by adhering strictly to the guidelines 
for rejection of lead aprons as described by Stam (12). 
The X-rays were taken in a licensed unit using a calibrated X-ray machine, and by a single 
radiographer at each hospital. Standardised parameters were used for every image 
obtained. The images were reviewed by a qualified radiologist. 
3.9 Summary 
The discussion in this chapter provides a description of the methodology used to conduct 
this study. The following chapter details the data collected, an analysis thereof and a 
discussion of the results of the study. 
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Chapter Four 
Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the results and discussion are presented. The objectives are re-iterated to 
provide context for the data: 
 describe the lead apron maintenance protocol at each hospital 
 describe the lead aprons available at each of the hospitals in terms of: number, 
age, manufacturer, identifying mark, lead equivalency, and design (single versus 
double layer) 
 perform a visual inspection of the aprons to describe external condition 
(cleanliness, holes, fasteners, blood) 
 perform an X-ray examination of all the available aprons in order to describe the 
size, number and location of defects in the lead lining 
 assess the aprons’ adequacy for protecting healthcare workers 
4.2 Sample realisation 
As per ethical necessitation, all of the aprons used in the main operating theatres at the 
three hospitals were included in the study. This was achieved by collecting data when no 
elective procedures were being performed. The researcher investigated all the available 
aprons not in use (physical inspection and radiography) and then substituted them for 
those in use. Where this was not possible, the remaining aprons were assessed on 
subsequent visits. 
A total of 87 aprons were identified across the three hospitals. No aprons were excluded. 
4.3 Results 
In this section percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
4.3.1 Objective: describe the lead apron maintenance protocol at 
each hospital 
No formal maintenance protocols existed at any of the three hospitals. Informal “protocols” 
at each hospital differed. The maintenance is divided into two distinct domains: daily care 
for the aprons and regular radiological assessment of the aprons. The daily care is 
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performed by the theatre staff who wear the aprons and the radiological assessments by 
the Quality Assessment Radiographers at the respective hospitals. 
CMJAH performs six-monthly, and if necessary more regular, fluoroscopic investigations 
of the available aprons and defective aprons are removed from circulation regularly. The 
location of cracks is marked on the outside of the apron and consideration is made as to 
whether the defect is on the front or back of the apron. At CMJAH the lead aprons that 
had been investigated most recently (12 out of 35, 34%) were labeled as such. 
CHBAH had not examined the theatre aprons fluoroscopically in the memory of the 
radiographer responsible. None of the theatre aprons had identifying numbers on them at 
the time of this study.  
HJH performs three-monthly visual inspections of their aprons for visible cracks and tears. 
Suspicious aprons are then X-rayed. Aprons with no defects or small defects in the 
periphery are returned to the circulation. If the cracks are deemed major then they are 
removed. Screening of the entire apron population is performed 2 yearly. 
These results are summarised in Table 4.1 
Table 4.1 Lead apron maintenance protocols 
Maintenance    Hospital 
CMJAH  CHBAH HJH 
Daily maintenance    
   Formal protocol No No No 
   Frequency of cleaning Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Radiographic maintenance 
   Formal protocol No No No 
   Frequency of 
   Radiological inspection 
6 monthly Erratic 3-24 monthly 
   Factors evaluated 
 
 
 
Presence of holes; 
location (front or 
back); evidence of 
holes from 
previous 
examination 
Presence of 
holes 
 
 
 
Presence of 
holes; size of 
holes (“small or 
large”); location 
(central or 
peripheral) 
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4.3.2 Objective: describe the lead aprons available at each of the 
hospitals in terms of: number, age, manufacturer, identifying 
mark, lead equivalency, and design (single versus double layer) 
The two largest hospitals had the most lead aprons, 35 at CMJAH and 36 at CHBAH. 
HJH, a smaller hospital, had 16 aprons in use in the theatre complex. 
At CMJAH, 18 out of 35 aprons had the date of purchase visible on the apron. At CHBAH 
a single apron bore the date of its purchase. No information was available to determine 
the age of the aprons at HJH. The average age of the 19 aprons with dates, was 4.26 
years (SD = 1,12 years). The newest was 1.5 years old and the oldest was 7.65 years old. 
Several distinct manufacturers/suppliers had provided aprons to the hospitals. These are 
described in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Description of apron manufacturers 
Manufacturer 
Hospital 
CMJAH 
 n (%) 
CHBAH 
n (%) 
HJH  
n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Med Mac Services 6 (17) 5 (14) 1 (6) 12 (14) 
Radshield 19 (54) 30 (83) 3 (19) 52 (60) 
Burlington Medical Supplies   1 (6) 1 (1) 
Unknown 10 (29) 1 (3) 11 (69) 22 (25) 
Total 35 36 16 87 
 
 
Identifying marks, such as apron numbers, were found on 17/35 (49%) of the Aprons at 
CMJAH, none of the aprons at CHBAH, and 12/16 (75%) of the aprons at HJH. In total 
58/87 (67%) aprons did not have identifying marks of any description. 
The different designs available at each hospital paralleled the multitudes of suppliers. 
HJH, had the highest number of distinct designs, in keeping with the high number of 
manufacturers. For 22/87 (25%) of the aprons, the manufacturer and lead equivalence 
were unidentifiable. CMJAH had the highest number of aprons of unknown lead 
equivalence (29%) as even some of the aprons from known manufacturers could not have 
their lead equivalence determined. Across the three hospitals 25/87 (29%) of the aprons 
were of unknown lead equivalence. An additional 20/87 (23%) were of known lead 
equivalence less than 0.35 mmPb. HJH is the only hospital to have an apron of 0.7 mmPb 
equivalent, the highest amount of protection available at any of the hospitals tested in this 
study. This is described in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Description of apron design and lead equivalence at the three 
hospitals.  
Design and lead 
equivalence (mmPb) 
Hospital 
CMJAH  
n (%) 
CHBAH  
n (%) 
HJH  
n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Front and back 35 (100) 14 (39) 8 (50) 57 (66) 
0.25 2 (6) 13 (36) 1 (6) 16 (18) 
0.35 19 (54)  2 (13) 21 (24) 
0.5 1 (3)   1 (1) 
Unknown 13 (37) 1 (3) 5 (31) 19 (22) 
Front only  18 (50) 6 (38) 24 (28) 
0.25  4 (11)  4 (5) 
0.5  14 (39)  14 (16) 
Unknown   6 (38) 6 (7) 
Wrap-around (double layered) 4 (11) 2 (12) 6 (7) 
0.5  4 (11) 1 (2) 5 (6) 
0.7   1 (2) 1 (1) 
Total 35 36 16 87 
 
 
The combination of age, manufacturer and lead equivalency of the garments was only 
documented for 19/87 (22%) aprons. 
4.3.3 Objective: perform a visual inspection of the aprons to 
describe external condition (cleanliness, holes, fasteners, blood) 
The visual inspection of the aprons assessed four variables: The general state of 
cleanliness of the apron; the absence or presence of macroscopic blood; the functionality 
of the various fasteners and the absence or presence of visible tears/defects. 
HJH had the highest number of dirty aprons while CMJAH had the cleanest overall. Blood 
stained aprons followed a similar pattern. These values are presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Physical attributes of the aprons at the three hospitals 
Attribute 
Hospital 
CMJAH  
n (%) 
CHBAH  
n (%) 
HJH  
n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Cleanliness     
   Clean 21 (60) 9 (25) 2 (13) 32 (37) 
   Moderately dirty 10 (29) 18 (50) 4 (25) 32(37) 
   Dirty 4 (11) 9 (25) 10 (63) 23 (26) 
Blood 
   No 32 (91) 25 (70)  12 (75) 69 (79) 
   Yes 3 (9) 11 (30) 4 (25) 18 (21) 
Tears 
   No 24 (69) 31 (86) 9 (56) 64 (74) 
   Yes 11 (31) 5 (14) 7 (44) 23 (26) 
Fasteners 
   Broken 12 (34) 6 (17) 3 (19) 21 (24) 
   Functional 23 (66) 30 (83) 13 (81) 66 (76) 
 
4.3.4 Objective: perform an X-ray examination of all the available 
aprons in order to describe the size, number and location of 
defects in the lead lining.  
The distribution of the defects found in the lead lining was non-uniform. Defects were 
detected in 52/87 (60%) of the aprons. The most defects described in a single apron was 
31. The majority of the defects (92%) were linear tears as opposed to areas/holes. Almost 
half the defects (44%) were found in the gonadal regions. This is presented in Table 4.5. 
Only the aprons with defects are listed. 
  
36 
 
Table 4.5 Number and location of defects identified by X-ray 
Apron 
No. 
No. of defects Additional 
radiation from 
defects (mSv) 
Linear Tear Holes 
Gonadal Non-gonadal Gonadal Non-gonadal 
CMJAH      
CMJAH (2)   1  0.001 
CMJAH (3) 2   1 0.139 
CMJAH (5) 1  1  0.146 
CMJAH (6)  1   0.005 
CMJAH (12)  1   0.011 
CMJAH (14)  1   0.006 
CMJAH (16)   1  0.026 
CMJAH (17)  2   0.004 
CMJAH (18) 1    0.008 
CMJAH (22) 1  1  0.040 
CMJAH (23) 3 4  1 0.541 
CMJAH (24) 14 11   1.198 
CMJAH (25)  1   0.006 
CMJAH (28) 2    3.036 
CMJAH (32)  2   0.002 
CHBAH  
CHBAH (2) 13 5   2.869 
CHBAH (3) 2 12  1 0.316 
CHBAH (4)  3   0.001 
CHBAH (9)  1   0.012 
CHBAH (10)  2   0.004 
CHBAH (11) 1 1   0.082 
CHBAH (12) 3 1   0.095 
CHBAH (13) 1 1   0.060 
CHBAH (14) 2    0.046 
CHBAH (18) 1 2   0.224 
CHBAH (19)   1  3.498 
CHBAH (20)  2   0.001 
CHBAH (22)  2   0.001 
CHBAH (23)  1   0.007 
CHBAH (24) 1    0.057 
CHBAH (25) 2 1   0.034 
CHBAH (26) 1 4   0.022 
CHBAH (27) 3 6   0.160 
CHBAH (28)  2   0.005 
CHBAH (29)  2   0.107 
CHBAH (30) 3 3   142.476 
CHBAH (31) 1 6   0.247 
CHBAH (34)  2   0.006 
CHBAH (36)  4   0.073 
 
37 
 
Table 4.5 Number and location of defects identified by X-ray (continued)  
Apron 
No. 
Defects Additional 
radiation from 
defects (mSv) 
Linear Tear Holes 
Gonadal Non-gonadal Gonadal Non-gonadal 
HJH  
HJH (1) 16  3 1 136.677 
HJH (2) 2 14  1 1.381 
HJH (3) 1  1 1 1.156 
HJH (4) 4 1   0.460 
HJH (5)   1  34.982 
HJH (8)  10   0.124 
HJH (10)   1 1 1.489 
HJH (11) 4 1   0.249 
HJH (12) 14 14 2 1 103.926 
HJH (13)  1   0.025 
HJH (14) 2 4   0.160 
HJH (15) 2 1   2.452 
HJH (16) 5 1   0.024 
 
 
Although it was not included as an objective in this study, and the study was not 
specifically powered for this interpretation, a statistical analysis was performed. A 
statistically significant relationship was found by performing a Fisher’s Exact test on the 
presence of visible tears and the radiological adequacy of the aprons (p=0,0005) 
(Table 4.6). Eighty-nine percent of the aprons with no visible tears were found to be 
radiologically adequate. 
Table 4.6 Visible defects and radiological findings 
Visible 
Defects 
Radiological Finding 
Safe Unsafe 
Yes 12 11 
No 57 7 
p=0,0005 
4.3.5 Objective: assess the aprons’ adequacy for protecting 
healthcare workers. 
It was found that 18 of the 87 (21%) aprons were no longer safe due to defects allowing 
excessive radiation exposure i.e. greater than 0,22 mSv. CMJAH had 9% unsafe aprons 
(3/35). CHBAH had 17% unsafe aprons (6/36) and, HJH had 57% unsafe aprons (9/16). 
The results of the X-ray examination are shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Radiological apron findings by hospital. 
In addition to the radiological defects detected, aprons were deemed inadequate for use if 
they were of a lead equivalence of less than 0,35 mmPb. Aprons of unknown lead 
equivalence were included in this group. In total, 45/87 (52%) of the aprons investigated 
were found to be unsafe due to inadequate lead equivalence. All 18 radiologically unsafe 
aprons were also of inadequate lead equivalence and therefore the total number of 
inadequate aprons was 45. This is shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Adequacy of aprons by radiological findings and lead equivalence 
Adequacy Criteria 
Hospital 
CMJAH  
n(%) 
CHBAH 
n(%) 
HJH 
n(%) 
Total 
n(%) 
Adequate lead equivalence 20 (57) 18 (50) 4 (25) 42 (48) 
Inadequate lead Equivalence 15 (43) 18 (50) 12 (75) 45 (52) 
Radiologically safe 12 (34) 12 (33) 3 (19) 27 (31) 
Radiologically unsafe 3 (9) 6 (17) 9 (56) 18 (21) 
Total 35 36 16 87 
  
The median additional exposure transmitted by the lead aprons that were removed from 
service was 1,44 mSv, (IQR = 0,48-3,38). Five of the aprons were found to be completely 
destroyed, to the extent that wearing one of them offered negligible protection. The 
additional radiation for each of the aprons that failed the radiological testing is presented 
in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Additional radiation exposure in mSv for each apron that failed by 
radiological criteria 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to audit the protective garments worn by anaesthetic staff 
at the three hospitals investigated and to assess the aprons’ adequacy and safety. 
Although the focus of the study was to evaluate the radiation to which anaesthetists are 
routinely exposed in theatre, the implications of the results are far reaching and of 
importance to a wide number of medical professionals. The lead aprons worn by the 
anaesthetists are from a shared pool and indeed the surgeons and nursing staff who wear 
them are often at greater risk than the anaesthetists, due to their proximity to the radiation 
source (5, 13, 67). 
Specifically, the amount of additional radiation the wearer of a damaged apron would be 
exposed to, was measured. This additional dose was calculated by imaging the aprons, 
measuring any observed defects and extrapolating the amount of radiation that would be 
transmitted through these defects. The methods used are internationally recognised (14, 
15). 
By documenting several easily measurable variables in addition to the radiological 
adequacy of the aprons, the researcher hoped to provide context for the results as well as 
identify aspects of apron maintenance that could be improved if in fact any existed. This 
would possibly result in better care of lead aprons and therefore better protection of 
medical professionals in the future. 
The radiological findings in this study were of great importance. It was found that 18 (21%) 
of the aprons were no longer fit for use due to excessive internal damage (Figure E.1, 
Appendix E). This means that theatre staff had a 1 in 5 chance of wearing a defective 
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apron. Some of the aprons were so damaged as to offer no protection whatsoever. Each 
apron that failed due to radiological findings also failed due to unknown or inadequate 
lead equivalence. Inadequate lead equivalence is conceptually the same as damaged 
aprons as both allow excessive radiation to be transmitted to the wearer. 
The lead equivalence of a “lead” apron is what confers its protection. Higher lead 
equivalency offers greater protection. This variable showed heterogeneity between and 
within the different hospitals. If the lead equivalence is unknown additional complications 
arise: 
When calculating the additional exposure as a result of defects in the lead-attenuating 
lining of the garments, the transmission for that lead equivalence (Table 2.2) is taken into 
consideration (11, 12). For reasons of safety, if the lead equivalence of a garment is 
unknown when performing these calculations, it must be assumed that the garment is of a 
lead equivalence with the lowest threshold for failure (0,5 mmPb for single layer aprons 
and 0,25 + 0,25 mmPb for double layer aprons). This may cause unnecessary removal of 
acceptable aprons if they are indeed of other lead equivalents, however it prevents 
potentially dangerous exposure to the wearer. 
Additionally, the South African Department of Health guidelines (17) stipulate that any 
personnel who will be within one metre of either the X-ray source or the patient shall wear 
a lead apron of at least 0,35 mmPb. If the lead equivalence of the apron is unknown it 
must be assumed to be less than 0,35 mmPb, or risk exposing the wearer to excessive 
radiation. These aprons are therefore unsuitable for use by the anaesthetists, surgeons, 
and scrub sisters. In addition the floor nurses may also fall into this category and so these 
aprons are unfit for use by most, if not all of the operating theatre staff.  
In this study 25/87 (29%) of the aprons were of unknown lead equivalence. An additional 
20/87 (23%) were of known lead equivalence less than 0.35 mmPb. All 18 of the aprons 
found to be unsafe for use by radiological criteria fell into one of these two groups. Thus 
45/87 (52%) of the aprons were found to be inadequate for use in theatre by anaesthetists 
and the majority of the theatre staff. Of note all the aprons known to be of lead 
equivalence 0,35 mmPb or greater were also found to be radiologically intact.  
Although the failure rate at all three hospitals was above the 3 to 4% per annum described 
by Stam and Pillay (12) for institutions performing annual quality control assessments, it 
was not uniform. CMJAH, CHBAH, and HJH had failure rates of 9%, 17%, and 56% 
respectively on radiological criteria. This increased to 43%, 50%, and 75% respectively 
when lead equivalence was taken into account. These figures are in line with hospitals 
embarking on maintenance inspections for the first time (12, 21). Although no formal 
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protocols existed at these hospitals, all had some form of maintenance program in place 
at the time of this study. 
The potential effects of this cannot be overstated. Each time a medical professional 
donned one of these inadequate aprons they were exposing themselves to excessive 
doses of radiation and significantly increasing their risk of skin changes, haematological 
and immune dysfunction, cancer, infertility and the myriad deleterious effects described 
more fully in Chapter 2 of this research report. Some of these effects are potentially fatal.  
Several possible explanations exist for the high failure rate of the aprons and insight can 
be gained by evaluating the results of the other objectives in this study.  
The adequacy of the aprons is intimately linked to the maintenance and quality control 
procedures at the respective hospitals. None of the three hospitals had written protocols 
but there were informal “protocols” which were being followed with varying degrees of 
success. The high failure rate of the lead aprons by radiological criteria highlights the 
inadequacy of the current maintenance programs in these hospitals and may be 
applicable to other hospitals as well. 
The daily maintenance did not have a formal identifiable protocol that was being followed 
and it was the impression of the researcher that very little, if any, daily care was being 
performed. This was borne out by the findings that only 32/87 (37%) of the aprons were 
found to be “clean” and 18/87 (21%) were found to have visible blood. 
Where the aprons were routinely inspected by the radiography departments it was done 
so fluoroscopically, in real-time, in a vacant operating theatre or in the X-ray department. 
No images were stored. None of the three hospitals had clear criteria for the removal of 
lead aprons from service and instead relied on the discretion of the radiographer 
performing the quality control checks.  
The South African Department of Health Guidelines For the Protection of Personnel in 
Theatre (17) state that “…protective clothing should bear an identifying mark and should 
be examined at yearly intervals.  Defective items should be withdrawn from use.” These 
guidelines do not stipulate how to inspect the aprons or what criteria to use to withdraw 
the aprons, thus at least partially explaining the protocols at the three hospitals. In 
comparison this study used guidelines set forth in the international literature (11, 12). 
Notably, 58/87 (67%) aprons did not have an “identifying mark” as required by law. 
The Department of Health Guidelines regarding protective clothing in theatre (17) are not 
being adhered to in respect of lead equivalence or identifying the aprons, furthermore the 
testing is not stringent or regular enough. None of the hospitals assessed all of their 
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aprons in any one sitting. None had complete records of their apron population to ensure 
that those aprons omitted were screened at the next investigation. It is possible that lead 
aprons favoured by the theatre staff (for reasons of weight, cleanliness, comfort or 
perceived superiority) could be excluded from testing in consecutive screenings. Thus, 
damaged aprons could remain in circulation for longer than the duration between 
scheduled checks, and evade the minimum yearly screening prescribed by The 
Department of Health.  
The wear and tear on the aprons between routine screenings may be excessive as 
compared with international settings and may contribute to the high radiological failure 
rate achieved in this study. The physical appearance of the aprons (cleanliness and blood, 
and visible defects and fastener functionality) are a surrogate for how well the theatre staff 
look after the aprons. While the radiography department is responsible for routine 
screening of the aprons to ensure that defective or unsafe aprons are removed from 
circulation, the daily care is the responsibility of those who wear the aprons and the 
theatre staff in general. It is logical that the better the aprons are cared for on a daily 
basis, the fewer aprons will be defective at annual or semi-annual screenings. 
Oyar et al (21) described very poor storage conditions for the aprons they investigated, 
and found 100% of the aprons to be unsafe for use. 
There is documentation both in the form of data collected in this study, and in the form of 
photographs taken by the researcher, that the aprons are not cared for properly by the 
theatre staff in between inspections. At all three hospitals aprons were found discarded 
over stretchers or chairs or even on the floor; instead of on the appropriate hangers 
(Figure E.2, Appendix E). The presence of visible defects or dysfunctional fasteners are 
likely to be as a result of poor handling of the aprons by the wearers, often manifested 
after completing a case and then not hanging the aprons up correctly. 
Visible cracks are defined as defects in the outer cosmetic lining of the aprons. This layer 
does not attenuate radiation and serves merely as a shell for the protective, inner lining. It 
is thought that the cracks develop in areas of repeated stress or strain and it follows that if 
the outer layer has been damaged in this way then the inner layer has probably been 
exposed to the same stressors. Michel and Zorn (20) recommended the removal of lead 
aprons from service on the basis of cosmetic damage alone due to the likelihood of 
underlying defects. These recommendations were not followed in this study as the 
protective lead layer was investigated directly using X-rays, and because of the additional 
costs the hospitals would incur in an already resource constrained setting. 
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Despite this seemingly logical association between outward appearance and radiological 
integrity Oyar et al. (21) found that two aprons described as “brand new, very clean and in 
good condition in terms of appearance” had defects so large as to render them destroyed. 
Similarly in this study some of the aprons which were found to be destroyed on X-ray, 
showed minimal exterior damage. Of the 18 aprons found to be internally destroyed, 7 
(39%) did not have any visible defects. Conversely 12 of the 69 remaining aprons (17%) 
did have visible defects but were found to be radiologically safe. This is illustrated in Table 
4.7 and Figure E.3 (Appendix E). 
If the lead aprons are not hung correctly, on the appropriate hangers and racks, they are 
prone to excessive strain from the weight of the absorbent materials and can break or tear 
at weak points (11, 20, 79). Of note, many of the visible tears identified were at the 
shoulder where both a buckle and a Velcro strip are intended to support the weight of the 
apron. Conceivably these tears are from misuse or disregard of this mechanism (Figure 
E.4, Appendix E). 
The apron populations at the three hospitals were inhomogeneous in all measured 
characteristics. This reflects the constant turnover inherent in the populations i.e. as the 
garments become damaged, they are replaced by newer, different models, perhaps 
representing a cheaper supplier or a change in legislature or medical knowledge, or a 
combination of these factors. 
A large number of aprons had no identifying features in terms of either manufacturer, age 
or lead equivalency. All three of these variables were known in only 19/87 (22%) of the 
aprons. This raises several questions about their quality, and fitness for service. 
Of initial concern is the number of unidentifiable suppliers. It is known that government 
procurement contracts are awarded predominantly (80 to 90%) on cost (86). This means 
that contracts are often awarded to the cheapest supplier and anecdotally it is thought that 
some of these products are of inferior quality. Glaze et al. (87) found that a small but 
significant number (<5%) of new aprons had defects on delivery, warranting return to 
manufacturer. Oyar et al. (21) found that 100% of the aprons in their hospital had 
unacceptably high radiation permeability i.e. they were not attenuating radiation by the 
amount expected, and were not safe for use. Similarly Muir et al. (88) and Finnerty et al 
(78) found that radiation permeability was not as advertised for many aprons. If the 
supplier of the aprons is not known then the quality of the apron must be questioned. The 
radiation permeability was not measured in this study due to the added complexity 
involved and the restraint on resources it would impose. 
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The design of the aprons showed wide variation. The different designs encountered 
included front only aprons, aprons with protection on the front and the back, and aprons 
that wrap-around the wearer thus protecting all sides of the body with a double layer of 
protection in the front. Concurrently all these designs existed in various lead equivalences. 
The South African Department of Health guidelines recommend that individuals who move 
around the theatre during the procedure should wear wrap-around lead aprons (17). This 
is a recommendation only and not a strict stipulation. Anaesthetists are probably the best 
example of professionals who move around during the procedure, however only 6 of the 
87 aprons (7%) were of a wrap-around design. It follows then that the majority of the time 
anaesthetists are not wearing optimum protection as described by the Department of 
Health. 
It was possible to ascertain the age of only 22% of the aprons. Oyar et al. (21) found no 
significant relationship between the time the aprons had been in use and the radiation 
permeability. In this study all of the aprons with a known date of purchase were found to 
be in satisfactory condition radiologically. Of these the oldest apron was 7,65 years old, 
with an additional radiation of 0.026mSv. This serves as an example of the longevity 
possible when proper maintenance is adhered to.  
Although not explicitly stated as an objective in this study it was found that none of the 
operating theatres audited had either thyroid shields or protective eyewear. This is in 
direct contravention of the government guidelines for radiation protection in theatre, which 
state:  
Only persons whose presence is necessary shall be in the theatre during 
exposures.  All such persons shall be protected (e.g., provided with leaded aprons, 
leaded gloves, eye protection (leaded glasses), thyroid shields and/or portable 
shields). (17) 
The operating theatres where very high radiation exposure was expected, such as those 
used for vascular and neuro-interventional procedures, did supply thyroid shields but no 
protective eye-wear.  
The mathematical formulae described in Appendix D and conceived by Stam and Pillay 
(12) make use of a “tissue weighting factor” (wt) for the gonadal region, as specified by 
the ICRP (33). The tissue weighting factor and the surface area of the gonads result in a 
smaller allowable tear over these organs before the maximum additional exposure is 
reached. Very similar figures (wt=0,05 for thyroid vs. 0,08 for gonads) would be used to 
assess the safety of thyroid shields as, like the gonads the thyroid is an extremely radio-
sensitive organ (5, 33). Protecting the thyroid is therefore as important as protecting the 
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gonads. The effective dose to the body is twofold higher if thyroid protection is not worn. 
This is because the thyroid shield protects all the underlying tissues (74). Thyroid shields 
are therefore as important as the lead aprons yet were not found in a single one of the 
theatres audited in this study. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter the results were presented followed by a discussion thereof. 
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Chapter Five 
Study summary, limitations, 
recommendations and 
conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a summary of the study is presented, followed by the limitations, 
recommendations and the conclusion. 
5.2 Study summary 
This study audited the protective lead aprons used at three academic hospitals in 
Johannesburg. It looked specifically at the aprons that would be worn by anaesthetists 
and therefore was confined to those aprons found in the main operating theatre complex 
in each hospital. The theatre maintenance routines were documented as well as various 
physical attributes of the aprons. Most importantly, the aprons themselves were evaluated 
radiologically to quantify any additional radiation the wearer would be exposed to. This 
allowed for the removal of all aprons that were deemed unsafe for use. 
In order to evaluate the maintenance protocols and the integrity of the aprons, commonly 
used international guidelines as well as the relevant South African Department of Health 
guidelines were followed (11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 33).  
With the aid of X-rays, 87 aprons were investigated in this study. The sample comprised 
of every lead apron in use in the hospitals’ main operating theatres and multiple sessions 
were required to prevent any aprons being excluded. The subjective findings such as 
degree of cleanliness were assessed by one individual (the researcher) in order to 
maximise consistency. The X-ray images were interpreted by a specialist radiologist to 
ensure accuracy. 
Ultimately it was found that 52% of the aprons in the operating theatres were not fit for 
use. While this finding obviously implicates quality control processes at the respective 
hospitals, the other findings of the study suggest that the health professionals who wear 
the aprons are also partially responsible. Finally it appears that the South African 
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Government guidelines lack sufficient clarity and guidance to be implemented in a 
consistent and therefore safe manner. 
In addition to the main objectives of the study it became apparent that additional 
protection from radiation in the form of thyroid shields and eye protection was not provided 
in the general operating theatres. This was in contravention to the Department of Health 
guidelines (17), as well as the majority of the literature reviewed on radiation exposure to 
anaesthetists  (3-5, 25), where thyroid shields were worn routinely although eyewear was 
not. The combination of defective aprons identified in this study and the lack of other 
routine mandatory shielding likely places the anaesthetists and other theatre staff at great 
risk. 
5.3 Limitations 
Several limitations apply to this study and should be considered when assessing the 
findings of the audit. Due to the contextual nature of the study it is uncertain to what extent 
the study findings can be generalised to other hospitals.  
Protective aprons in high exposure areas such as the angiography suite, CT and cardiac 
catheterisation laboratories were not included in this investigation. 
Although every possible precaution was taken to ensure that all the theatre aprons were 
included in the study, the possibility exists that some were not assessed. As none of the 
three hospitals had an inventory of the aprons in their theatre complex, it is not possible to 
know if additional aprons exist.  
5.4 Recommendations 
5.4.1 Recommendations for clinical practice 
The results of this study necessitate a change of maintenance program at the three 
hospitals investigated. Written protocols should be created for all aspects of apron care 
including daily storage and cleaning, and radiological assessment. 
It is recommended that the respective radiography departments adopt the criteria 
suggested by Stam and Pillay (12). While this is more time consuming than the current 
screening regimens, it adds far greater precision to the decision making process and 
would only need to be done once or twice a year.  
The images from screening the aprons would need to be saved for later review, but only 
those images where defects were identified, therefore not every image would need to be 
reviewed, and thus the additional time/labour required is likely to be minimal. 
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Accurate, updated records of the apron populations need to be kept in apron registers. In 
this study 13 aprons needed to be removed from the operating theatres as their lead 
equivalence was unknown, despite the aprons being intact and otherwise fit for service. 
Complete records of the apron population may have prevented this. The apron registers 
should indicate the apron number, manufacturer, lead equivalence, date of purchase, date 
of last inspection, presence and location of any defects. Each individual apron must be 
clearly marked with an identifying number. This would ensure that no aprons are excluded 
from screening. Over time it may also allow the most cost affordable manufacturers to be 
identified as trends may emerge. Small acceptable cracks could be more closely 
monitored to determine if they are enlarging. Stam and Pillay found an average increase 
in defect length of 270% over a 10 month follow up period (12). 
It is recommended that any new aprons which are purchased are of at least 0,35mmPb 
and of a wrap-around design.  
It is recommended that theatre staff receive additional information and inservice training 
on the care of protective garments as they are the ones most likely to be causing the 
defects. They should also be informed of the law surrounding radiation protection in 
theatre so as to better protect themselves.  
5.4.2 Recommendations for further research 
The results of this audit lead to the removal of more than half of the aprons investigated. 
Therefore similar audits should be undertaken in other hospitals. Furthermore very little 
research has been done on the exposure of South African theatre staff to radiation. As our 
working conditions may differ significantly from those in other countries it is recommended 
that exposure of medical professionals be investigated.  
A further study should repeat this investigation in the areas of the hospital not assessed 
thus far e.g. angiography suite and CT scanner. 
Another domain that may be of interest is to assess whether the lead aprons found in the 
South African operating theatres actually attenuate radiation by the amount advertised, as 
studies have found this to not always be the case (21, 88).  
5.5 Practice changes following the completion of the 
study 
The relevant individuals and departments at the three hospitals were informed of the 
findings of this study in writing. The list of inadequate aprons at the respective hospitals 
was attached as well as a brief summary of the findings and reasons for finding the 
49 
 
aprons inadequate. Garments that had gross defects identified at the time of screening 
were removed from service immediately and not returned to the theatre pool. Additional 
aprons identified as inadequate after interpreting the X-ray films were removed from 
service as a result of the written notification. An example of the written notification is 
provided in Appendix F. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Fifty two percent of the protective garments worn in the operating theatres investigated in 
this study were found to be inadequate. The high failure rate is thought to be multifactorial 
and the radiography departments, theatre staff and Department of Health guidelines are 
all at least partially responsible. 
The effects of using the damaged aprons may be far reaching and include severe 
morbidity and even mortality but are not easily quantifiable. The importance of this will 
only grow as the amount of radiography assisted procedures increases in the future. 
Recommendations have been made according to international and South African 
guidelines as how best to improve the safety for all theatre staff in the future.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Data collection sheets 
Data Collection Sheet 1 
 
Date of inspection:  
 
Date of last inspection:                                   Unknown:                                          
 
Apron identification number:  
 
Hospital:  CHBAH           CMJAH              HJH 
 
Manufacturer:                                                             Unknown:  
 
Lead equivalence:  0,25mmPb        0,35mmPb        0,5mmPb 
                                  Unknown 
Design: Front only         Front and back no sides        Wrap-around      
 
Age:                  years             Unknown 
 
Physical Appearance: 
Presence of Identifying Number: Yes        if yes, number            No 
  
Cleanliness: Clean            Moderately dirty             Dirty 
Blood:    Yes           No  
Visible tears:       Yes           No 
Fasteners:      Functional            Broken 
 
(pg. 1) 
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X-ray results                                                     (pg. 2) 
Linear Cracks 
Number Size (mm) Location 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.   
 
Holes 
Number Size 
(mm2) 
Location 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.   
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Data Collection Sheet 2 
 
Hospital:  CHBAH           CMJAH              HJH 
Formal protocol for daily cleaning:        Yes          No 
If yes, describe the protocol: _______________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
Formal protocol for apron maintenance and screening:Yes         
                                                                                               No  
Who is responsible for maintaining the aprons?: ______________ 
________________________________________________________ 
How often is maintenance performed?:_______________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
How are the aprons inspected?: ____________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
What are the criteria for removing an apron?: _________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B – Approval from the University 
Approval to conduct the study from Postgraduate Committee of 
the University of the Witwatersrand  
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Ethics waiver for the study from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand 
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Appendix C – Approval from hospitals 
Approval to conduct the study from the CEO of CMJAH 
 
 
  
62 
 
Approval to conduct the study from the Medical Advisory 
Committee of CHBAH 
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Approval to conduct the study from the CEO of HJH 
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Appendix D – Derivation of the criteria used to reject inadequate 
lead aprons as proposed by Stam. (12) 
 
The effective dose for a lead apron with a defect of area “a” is given by equation 1: 
 
Etot (a) = wt X H X T X (𝟏 −  
𝒂
𝑨
 ) + wt X H X ( 
𝒂
𝑨
 )           (Eqn 1) 
 
Where “wt” is the tissue weighting factor, “H” is the unshielded equivalent dose 
exposing an effective area “A” with a transmission “T”. 
In practice, defects appear as tears with a length “L” rather than an area “a”. 
Therefore equation 1 is derived for a tear with a length “L” (Fig D.1)  
 
To convert from a linear tear of length “L” to area “a”, i.e., circle with a maximum 
area a (= π𝑟2) with circumference 2L = 2 π𝑟, equation 2 is derived where the radius 
is substituted for the length: 
 
Eadd (L) = wt X H X 
(𝑳𝟐/𝝅)
𝑨
 (1 – T)                                  (Eqn 2) 
 
The value for transmission “T” is related to the lead equivalence of the apron and 
is provided in Table 2.2 reproduced here for completeness. 
 
Table 2.2 Transmission values for aprons of different lead equivalences. (12)  
Lead equivalence (mmPb) Transmission  
0,25 0,19 
0,35 0,10 
0,50 0,038 
0,70 0,010 
1,00 0,0014 
Figure D.1 Conversion from linear tear to area of defect 
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Stam (12) defines the rejection criteria as “the maximum additional dose that is 
just tolerable, i.e… 0,22 mSv.” Using this dose and either equation 1 or 2 (for an 
area or a tear respectively), the maximum tolerable defect size for lead aprons of 
various lead equivalences can be calculated. 
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Appendix E - Figures 
 
 
 
Figure E.1 X-ray images from HJH. Top left an intact apron, top right a defective 
apron removed from service. The black areas represent holes, the white areas 
occur where the lead attenuating layer has folded on itself. The neck lines are 
clearly visible on each apron as a semicircular black hole at the top of the images, 
the apron on the right has numerous additional black areas where the defects are 
present. The apron on the right allowed an additional dose of 136,6 mSv to the 
wearer. Bottom images, three destroyed aprons removed from service. 
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Figure E.2 Examples of the poor storage conditions as identified by the researcher. 
From left to right: an apron at HJH hung on the correct rack, but in a manner likely 
to cause damage and contrary to prescribed guidelines; two aprons at CMJAH 
draped over orthopaedic equipment; an apron at CHBAH draped over a trolley; and 
an apron crumpled on the floor. 
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Figure E.3 Top right: a photo of an apron at CHBAH shows a relatively intact 
exterior but the X-ray of the same apron (top left) reveals that all the radiation 
attenuating material has in fact collapsed at the bottom of the apron and no 
protection is afforded over the chest. The bottom image depicts an apron from 
CMJAH with large visible defect, which was found to be radiologically intact (safe). 
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Figure E.4 Four different aprons are depicted. Clockwise from the top: an apron 
from CHBAH with broken shoulder mechanism repaired with adhesive tape; an 
apron from HJH with the same arrangement at the shoulder; an apron from CMJAH 
illustrating a broken buckle mechanism; and lastly an apron from CMJAH 
illustrating a defective Velcro mechanism.  
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Appendix F – Sample of letter to hospitals discussing results 
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